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1. INTRODUCTION
The high rate of crime in Russia and the prominence of the
Russian Mafia are well known and publicized in the West.
President Yeltsin has called crime, which is choking the emerging
market economy, Russia's biggest problem.' An article in U.S.
News & World Report describes Russia as "a vast bazaar in which
the easiest way to get rich is to steal."2 The government has
shown itself ineffective in combating crime and in establishing a
rule of law. Consequently, many ordinary Russians, who are
experiencing a decline in their standard of living,3 are more
ambivalent about the march towards capitalism than they were in
1991. Many Western businesses are understandably reluctant to
enter an area in which corruption is rampant and the future
uncertain. However, the reasons behind the present conditions
are too often inadequately understood. As a result, the remedy
and the appropriate role of Western companies in the developing
market of countries of the former Soviet Union are not clearly
* Richard T. De George is University Distinguished Professor of
Philosophy, of Russian and East European Studies, and of Business
Administration, and Director of the International Center for Ethics in Business
at the University of Kansas. His books include The New Marxism; Soviet Ethics
and Morality; Business Ethics; and Competing with Integrity in International
Business.
1 He has frequently called fighting crime his top priority. See Jack F.
Matlock, Russia: The Power of the Mob, NY REVIEW OF BOOKS, July 13, 1995,
at 12, 13; see also Julie Corwin et al., The Looting of Russia, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Mar. 7, 1994, at 36 (noting the many ways in which crime
is undermining Yeltsin's reforms).
2 Corwin et al., supra note 1, at 36; see also Erin Arvedlund, Murder in
Moscow, FORTUNE, Mar. 3, 1997, at 128 (describing the business environment
in Russia as "gangland brutality passing for commerce"); Craig Mellow, Russia's
Robber Barons, FORTUNE, Mar. 3, 1997, at 120 (noting that the emerging class
of Russian bankers attained their power and wealth through illegal ties).
I See Russia's Standard of Living Is Declining, Moscow NEWS, May 12,
1995, at 9.
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1.1. Soviet History
The transition from the Russian social and economic structures
of 1917 to the socialist structures of the Soviet Union took about
fifteen years. 4 During the ensuing period until 1991, the govern-
ment, under the Communist Party, held complete sway over all
aspects of Soviet life. The state was the only employer and the
only owner of the productive resources of the country. The state
controlled education, outlawed almost all religion, and provided
all social services. Such state control resulted in the breakdown
and virtual disappearance of, in the language of Hegel and Marx,
a "civil society."5 According to Hegel and Marx, a "civil society"
consists of the informal structures that grow up together with the
rise of free enterprise or capitalism and the spread of democracy.
These informal structures include private businesses, clubs,
non-governmental organizations, and private groups of all sorts
that are independent of government control. During the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe and the United
States, civil society and its institutions were and continue today to
be the bearers of the values, including the ethical and moral
values, of the society. Civil society includes myriad structures and
groups that reinforce the values necessary for a free and reason-
ably efficient functioning society. These various groups and
structures tend to police or rein in abuses by other groups.
Business transmitted and reinforced a work ethic; labor organized
and stood up to industry to curb gross exploitation and injustice;
consumers gained a voice when they felt abused; environmentalists
organized to defend interests that they felt were being threatened,
and so on.
In the Soviet Union, the state eliminated all such initiatives,
and private groups and the state assumed all the functions
previously performed by civil society. The ethics and morality of
pre-Soviet days were labeled "bourgeois," and there was a
' By 1933, when Stalin had put an end to Lenin's New Economic Policy
and the forced collectivization of farms, the last step in state ownership, had
been completed. See GEORGE VERNADSKY, A HISTORY OF RUSSIA ch. 14 (5th
ed. 1961).
5 See, e.g., KARL MARX, Bruno Bauer, "Die JUDENFRAGE," in KARL
MARX: EARLY WRiTINGS 22-31 (T.B. Bottomore ed. & trans., McGraw-Hill
1964).
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systematic attempt to replace bourgeois values with socialist values
and to promote a communist morality that was developed and
preached by the state.6 The Soviet Union was more successful in
destroying civil society than in inculcating allegiance to commu-
nist morality. Corruption was evident in the Soviet system in
which influence and connections were often necessary to obtain
goods and services, in which the idea of service was equated with
inequality and hence, suspect, and in which the nomenklatura, or
the functionaries in power, controlled what got done and how.
2. RussIA's TRANSITION TO CAPITALISM
With the fall of the communist system many Westerners and
Western businesses assumed that privatization of industry was all
that was necessary for business in the newly-formed post-Soviet
states to become similar to business in the West. They, however,
were mistaken. Western businesses failed to realize that, in the
West, countries have not only developed a system of laws that
govern the operation of business and that keep the "playing field"
reasonably level, but that Western countries also have govern-
ments that are able and willing to enforce the law. In contrast,
when the Soviet Union disintegrated, its laws and structures were
replaced inadequately. Former functionaries took advantage of
their positions, as they had in the past. The government did not
act and, because of internal reasons, could not act to establish the
required laws.
The tax system is in disarray and almost non-functioning. The
police are ineffective and many former KBG members use their
training in a newly emerged mafia. Most basic of all, with the
breakdown of central control, there were no organs of civil
society to replace the vacuum that appeared. Added to this, the
population had been taught that capitalist society was exploitative,
unjust, and a society of "dog-eat-dog." When such a society
emerged, many Russians imagined that this was, in fact, the kind
of society they had now chosen and that they had the choice
either of this or of their former unacceptable condition.
Russia's transition to capitalism is shaky and uncertain, in part,
because of a reliance on what I have called "scientific capitalism." 7
6 See RIcHARD T. DE GEORGE, SOVIET ETHICS AND MORALITY 6 (1969).
" See Richard T. De George, Scientific Capitalism: The Stage After
Communism, PROBLEMS OF POST-COMMUNISM, May-June 1995, at 15-16.
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The doctrine of "scientific capitalism" consists of a belief that the
way to the new stage of society is through immediate and full
privatization of industry with heavy emphases on the economy
and the development of free enterprise. Western economic
advisors have advocated this stragegy, and the Russian leadership
has followed. "Scientific capitalism," however, has several
flaws. One is the dubious belief that a successful free market
economy can develop without an adequate set of political and
social background conditions: a rule of law, legally binding
contracts that are enforced, a stable and rational tax system, and
basic respect for those with whom one does business. None of
these conditions exists in Russia today. However, many ordinary
Russians, Russian leaders, and Western advisors rationalize their
absence and the concomitant conditions of crime and corruption
as simply a necessary stage through which incipient capitalism
historically went and through which Russian capitalism must also
go.
Although it is arguably true that Western capitalism progressed
through such a stage, the belief that any society that wishes to be
capitalist must go through that same stage is false. It is a myth
supported by those who believe that getting the economy "jump
started" by private individuals regardless of whether they are
criminals or former government officials who continue to exploit
the workers and the people is immaterial. It is a view held by
those in the West who believe ethics has no role in an economy,
and who wrongly believe that once the Russian economy is
privatized, it is immune from political domination or from a
reversion to a repressive system. Ironically, this view is an
application of the discredited view of Marx that the economic
conditions or base of a society determine the political and social
superstructure of a society. Other aspects of the now otherwise
discredited teachings of Karl Marx also bolstered this myth.
Marx stressed the corruption that accompanied the early
accumulation of capital! Many Russians who rejected Marx-
ism-Leninism nonetheless believe Marx's description of capitalism
as inherently exploitative and predatory. They accept Marx's
notion of necessary stages, wild capitalism being the necessary
precursor to the developed capitalism with its high standard of
I See KARL MARx, CAPTAL 713-16 (Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling
trans., Foreign Languages Publ'g House 1959) (1887).
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living that many Russians desire. They also adopt the Marxist
view that historical inevitability justifies the immorality they are
witnessing. All three of these tenets, however, are false with
respect to Russia today. Corruption is not a necessary or
inevitable concomitant of incipient capitalism. Even Marx held
that one country can and should learn from another and thus ease
the birth pangs that accompany the move from one economic
system to another.
Clearly, corruption fuels corruption. If it is tolerated and
accommodated, it grows. If it becomes part of the way of doing
business, it is increasingly difficult to uproot and eradicate.
Business on a large scale, however, does not flourish amidst
corruption. Business requires trust, the honoring of contracts, and
basic honesty if it is to function smoothly and efficiently.
Otherwise, the transaction and monitoring costs undermine
fruitful development. Bribery hinders rather than spurs economic
development and tends to keep inefficient markets inefficient.
Recent issues of both Business Week and Transparency Internation-
aP reported on the significant cost of corruption in international
business. Given this background, and the unsettled political, legal,
and economic conditions in Russia, the question has arisen of
whether or not U.S. companies should adopt local practices that
they consider necessary to remain competitive, even if this means
engaging in corrupt practices.
2.1. A Corrupt System
Arguably, Russian entrepreneurs are caught in a corrupt
system. Because there is no rational or ethically justifiable
allocation of resources, the rules of the economic game are not
clear. Much of the economy is, in fact, if not quite in theory,
operating along the lines of the former Soviet economy. Some
industries are still state subsidized. Raw materials, machinery, and
most productive resources tend to be earmarked for the large
factories to which they were previously sent, to the disadvantage
of small entrepreneurs. There is little in the way of a truly free
market of resources and goods. Hence, small entrepreneurs feel
that they must get their supplies where, when, and how they can.
" See Karen Pennar, The Destructive Costs of Greasing Palms, Bus. WK., Dec.
6, 1993, at 136; How Much Corruption Costs, TRANSPARENCY INT'L NEWSL.
(Transparency Int'l, Berlin, F.R.G.), Mar. 1994, at 5.
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They cannot be too choosy about how their sources obtained the
goods they are offered. In a corrupt system, they plausibly argue,
the ethical rules are not always clear. The only way to ensure
that one's hands are clean is to abstain from entering the market.
However, that would leave all entrepreneurial activity to the
Russian mafia and to former Soviet bureaucrats. Operating as
they can within the emerging system is the lesser of two evils for
such entrepreneurs. Similarly, many small entrepreneurs claim
they must pay bribes and extortion to be able to function. This
is less bad than demanding bribes or extortion, and once again this
is the lesser of two evils.
Assuming that this justification for the way small Russian
entrepreneurs operate is accepted,10 does not, however, justify the
murder of one's competitors, the exploitation of one's workers,
or the cheating of one's customers. The justification extends only
to those actions necessary to remain in business in a corrupt
environment, where the alternative is to cede the field entirely to
the corrupt. This argument also does not justify bribery,
extortion, or other forms of corruption.
2.2. Approaches to Facing Corruption
No country openly argues that bribes to government officials
are ethically justifiable, even when they are demanded as neces-
sary, or held to be customary. Extortion payments, even when
imposed, also are not openly justified. Nonetheless, the issues of
bribery, extortion, and other forms of corruption continue to be
of concern for multinationals. One alternative, an ethically
unacceptable one, is to adopt local custom and pay bribes. Some
Western companies have accepted the local conditions and work
within the existing framework, paying bribes and extortion, and
reaping available short term gains. Doing so cannot be justified
for multinationals the way it might be justified for local entrepre-
neurs."1 Moreover, legally, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
'0 For a more complete discussion, see Richard T. De George, International
Business Ethics: Russia and Eastern Europe, 19 SOC. RESP.: BUS., JOURNALISM,
LAW, MED. 5 (1993).
" For a more fully developed argument, see Richard T. De George, Business
Ethics in Primitive Capitalism: What Rules for Russia?, 1994 INT'L ASSN FOR
Bus. & SOC'Y 1994 PROC. 32.
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("FCPA) 12 prevents U.S. corporations from paying bribes to
government officials.13
A second alternative is to abide by the provisions of the
FCPA, which allows facilitating payments, but requires abstention
from paying bribes to government officials. The FCPA does not
forbid paying extortion or, as the local entrepreneurs do, getting
one's goods where, when, and how one can. However, the
justification for so doing, even if it applies to local entrepreneurs,
does not apply to U.S. multinationals. The justification of
choosing the lesser of two evils does not apply to multinationals
because they are not forced to operate in Russia; they have hard
currency that is in great demand; and they have the power and
resources to withstand the graft, violence, and corruption that
surround them.
Too many U.S. multinationals believe the claim that they
must cooperate with corrupt elements to operate in Russia. Some
also take advantage of the chaos and use it to their financial
benefit. In both cases, they add to the problem. However, U.S.
and other foreign multinationals can and should be part of the
solution. Foreign companies may need a cultural broker to
negotiate the shoals of Russian bureaucracy. They do not need a
moral broker in the sense that they shift responsibility to their
broker to do whatever is necessary in the way of bribes, payoffs,
and extortion.
A third approach is to adopt circumventionist practices, such
as substituting so-called charitable contributions to the favorite
charity of the government official in question. In some societies,
this technique has worked.14  The aim of the government
officials in some societies is not to gain personally but to share
their bribes with their extended family. Some U.S. companies,
understanding this aim, have sought to realize it directly and
1" Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. SS 78dd-1 to 78dd-2
(1994).
13 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a).
14 This is not dissimilar from U.S. corporations contributing to charitable
and civic causes in the U.S. communities in which they are ocated. For
examples of U.S. companies building schools, a mosque, and other community
facilities, see Robert McClements, Every Cloud Has a Zip-Out Lining, in ETHIcS
AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BUSINESS ETHICS 113, 115 (W. Michael Hoffman
et al. eds., 1986).
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legally. For instance, these companies have agreed to build a
school or hospital or otherwise contribute to the welfare of the
community as payment for a large contract. There is no evidence
that this sort of approach is a viable one in Russia, where the aim
of government officials appears not to help their community but
to enrich the officials.
Doing business in Russia at the present time is fraught with
difficulties and dangers. Those U.S. companies that are willing to
take the chances necessary to gain a potentially profitable foothold
can do so best by helping the ethical elements in the country fight
the criminal element and the increasing economic chaos. If they
use their moral imagination, they can be part of the solution
instead of being an increasing part of the problem.
2.2.1. Adoption of a United Front "Sullivan-Type"
Approach
Thus, a fourth approach is preferable. This approach is to
adopt a united front vis-a-vis corruption. Transparency Interna-
tional has helped raise the issue of corruption to a visible level in
Europe, and there is more support now than previously for some
positive action against corruption rather than passive acquiescence.
None of the firms appears to have realized that all of the strategies
they have adopted thus far are short-term solutions and that the
firms can best exert a significant and positive influence by joint
activity. Foreign companies face systemic problems, and they
attempt to solve and resolve them individually, at great expense,
inefficiently, and ineffectually. Systemic answers are the only
solution to systemic problems.
Faced with organized crime and corruption, the only answer
is an organized counter force; faced with the lack of civil society,
the only answer is the development of civil society - a task that
individual foreign firms cannot accomplish but that organizations
of such firms can help promote. The point is not to impose
Western values on the Russian people, but to promote those
values necessary for a functioning democratic, free enterprise
society. Taking the initiative in this respect is for the foreign
companies a matter of self-interest, but a self-interest of which the
host country and its people are also beneficiaries. One can put
the task in moral or ethical terms as the need to help establish an
ethics of civil society; but such a task is part of the requirements
for a successful and efficient market system. Thus, it is both an
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ethical and altruistic and a self-interested task.
This Article proposes that Russia, Ukraine, and other
countries that were part of the Soviet Union require something
like a "Sullivan Code." This Article shall focus on Russia, because
it is the largest of these countries, and in many ways, the most
important of them on the world scene. Nonetheless, this Article
applies equally well to Ukraine and to some other former Soviet
states. The problem in those new states that are Muslim dominat-
ed are somewhat different, especially to the extent that Muslim
fundamentalism is at odds with Western notions of civil society,
and the goals, aspirations, and desires of the population are not
necessarily to emulate the Western developed democracies.
First, a coalition of U.S. multinationals can send a strong
message to the honest Russian entrepreneurs, workers, and
government officials that they are valued and respected and that
they, and not the shady or criminal elements, are the partners the
multinationals seek. Second, they can show, by their example, the
benefits of free enterprise to all if certain restraints are followed
and if the good of all the stakeholders - shareholders, workers,
customers, local neighborhoods where plants are located, and the
general public - are considered in the firm's operations. Third,
they can cooperate with the government, and, if necessary,
encourage and induce it to pass and enforce legislation that
protects small businesses and fosters honest entrepreneurship.
Some U.S. firms, such as McDonald's and Ben & Jerry's,
refused to deal with the criminal element, by not paying bribes or
extortion, and demonstrated concern for their employees and
customers. 15 One consequence for both was considerable delay
in being able to open their operations. However, they were able
to locate honest and reliable suppliers and to avoid dealing with
and becoming dependent on the criminal element.
Getting this message across individually, firm by firm, is costly
in time, effort, and money, as Ben and Jerry's learned before it
finally decided to withdraw from Russia.16  Each business,
however, need not reinvent the proverbial wheel. In South Africa,
U.S. multinationals learned that adoption of and adherence to the
15 See, e.g., George Melloan, Big Macs Yes, but Don't Wait Up for Russian
Capitalism, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1990, at A15.
16 See Betsy McKay, Ben & Jerry's Post-Cold War Venture Ends in Russia
with Ice Cream Melting, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 1997, at A14.
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Sullivan Principles ("Principles") allowed them to exert public
pressure against apartheid as well as avoid discriminatory practices
in their own plants." These actions neither constituted an
importation of U.S. morality nor an imposition of it on another
country. Rather, these actions simply respected the rights of the
blacks who were unjustly treated by the apartheid laws.
U.S. companies in Russia may serve a like purpose. The
similarity between the two cases is that U.S. companies find
themselves operating in an arguably corrupt environment. The
nature of the corruption, however, is different. Apartheid was an
officially sanctioned policy of the government. In contrast, the
corruption in Russia is not officially sanctioned, even when the
corruption is within the government. When Reverend Sullivan
proposed his Principles, he saw them as a temporary justification
for U.S. companies investing in South Africa." The justification
was contingent on the Sullivan Principles' eradication of apartheid
from within.19 After ten years, Sullivan declared the experiment
a failure.20 Many U.S. companies became signatories of the
Sullivan Principles because of pressure from stockholders, church
groups, universities, and others.1 Many of the U.S. companies
were already in South Africa and adopted the Principles as an
alternative to disinvestment in South Africa. The climate was
favorable to business in South Africa: the government was stable,
if repressive; law and order prevailed; contracts were enforced; and
profits were secure. None of these factors is applicable with
respect to U.S. companies in Russia. Nonetheless, the example of
joint action is the part of the lesson that can be fruitfully adopted
and adapted.
" See Leon H. Sullivan, The Role of Multinational Corporations in Helping
to Bring About Change in South Africa, in ETHICS AND THE MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
BUSINESS ETHICS, supra note 14, at 379, 382-83.
s On May 7, 1985, Sullivan announced a 24-month deadline after which,
if apartheid was not abolished, U.S. companies should withdraw. See Leon H.
Sullivan, A Deadline for Ending Aparthed, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 7, 1985, at
23A; Sullivan, supra note 17, at 382-83.
19 See Sullivan, supra note 17, at 381-82.
20 For more details, see RICHARD T. DE GEORGE, BUSINESS ETHICS 504-11
(4th ed. 1995).
21 For a detailed account of U.S. corporations and the Sullivan Principles,
see OLIVER F. W ILIAMS, THE APARTHEID CRISIS: How CAN WE Do JUSTICE
IN A LAND OF VIOLENCE 66-67, 70-76, 93-97 (1986).
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Because independent action is so difficult in Russia, the time
is ripe for cooperative corporate action. A possible approach is
for leading businesses interested in doing business in Russia to
formulate and publicly promulgate and follow a set of guiding
principles for operating in Russia. Signatories can go on record
that they oppose working with corrupt elements. The contents
of the code need not be elaborate and, in fact, may be relatively
simple. Five items are obvious candidates for inclusion:
1. Signatories will not pay bribes or extortion.
2. Signatories will honor and demand that those with
whom they do business honor contracts.
3. Signatories will respect the environment.
4. Signatories will follow standards of truth in advertising.
5. Signatories will not exploit workers.
The list is in no way exceptional and states what most
companies in the United States would consider the routine way
of doing business. They include items that would be present in
many corporate codes. They are also norms that most U.S.
citizens, whether consumers or stockholders, would support. Yet,
despite their unexceptional sound, they are norms that are
regularly violated as business is transacted in Russia.
As stated, the guidelines are vague. With respect to the first
item, would companies wish to distinguish between bribes and
facilitating or "grease" payments, as the FCPA does, or would
signatories refuse to pay bribes not only to government officials
but to everyone - to suppliers and to members of the mafia?
Clearly, the latter is the preferable line to take. The FCPA
already prohibits bribes to government officials. 22 The problem
in Russia is also the mafia and other criminal elements. Hence,
the code should address that issue directly and forcefully if it is to
be an effective tool. Like other business people in Russia, U.S.
companies may have to provide protection for their executives
and their premises. It is better, however, to provide that
protection oneself and in conjunction with others and the
government than to pay the criminal element for such protection.
The honoring of contracts, the second item, is at the heart of
2 See 15 U.S.C. S 78dd-2(a)(2).
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business transactions in a free market system. Unless contracts are
honored, the transaction costs necessary to safeguard one's
investment frequently make the transaction unprofitable. By
making the honoring of contracts part of the code, U.S. compa-
nies commit themselves to acting as they should and put their
Russian partners on notice about the importance of living up to
a contract and fulfilling its terms. One result may be to encour-
age the Russian government to pass and enforce legislation
concerning contracts. Even without this, U.S. firms can use
publicity to expose gross breaches of contract whether they be by
the government or by Russian firms. Publicity will also identify
those firms that do not live up to their contracts so others can
avoid dealing with them.
It is difficult to specify exactly what respect for the environ-
ment, the third item, entails. There are few laws in Russia that
protect the environment, and the standards of accepted pollution
are much lower than those tolerated anywhere in the United
States. Should signatories only come up to standards specified by
law? How far beyond those should they go? Ethics demands that
corporations not harm people. However, exactly what ethics
demands beyond that with respect to the environment is not
always clear. There are trade-offs in many decisions about
acceptable levels of pollution. It is possible for one society to
choose a higher level of pollution than another society that is not
ready or willing to bear the cost of cleaner air, water, or land.
The ethical level of producing no harm is the one to which U.S.
firms should commit themselves. That will be higher than the
level demanded, much less enforced, by the Russian government.
How much beyond the ethical minimum U.S. companies may
wish to go will depend on a great many factors. Nonetheless,
U.S. companies in Russia already have the environmental-
protecting technology they have developed in their operations in
the United States, and frequently that can be transferred. The
final acceptable level to which they commit themselves and on
which they agree to be audited should be set by the companies
involved, conscious of the fact that the level will be made public,
and hence that it must be defensible at home as well as in Russia.
The other items in the list are subject to a similar analysis.
With respect to the fourth item, for example, signatory companies
must decide whether puffery is allowable in advertising, and, if so,
what degree of puffery is permissible. In determining precisely
[Vol. 18:41204
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how to interpret truth in advertising, the participating companies
should realize that the Russian population does not have the
experience of U.S. consumers, even though they have learned not
to believe everything they are told. Determining what actually
deceives people and what is and is not acceptable in advertising
will necessarily involve some research and discussion among the
signatories. The norm of truth in advertising, however, is one
that must be interpreted in the U.S. context as well. That does
not make it any less a norm to which companies hold themselves
and to which consumers hold companies.
It also is difficult to state explicitly what constitutes exploita-
tion of workers, item five. Are workers exploited if they are paid
by U.S. firms the going wage - even if it is the equivalent of
$100.00 a month - for someone like a computer engineer who
would earn $75,000 a year for the same work in the United
States? The answer is arguably no. A fair wage is not necessarily
the same wage paid for similar work in the United States. 3 The
cost of living is higher in the United States, and the competitive
market, at least in part, is an important factor in determining how
high wages go. It is much easier to discuss the minimum below
which wages should not go. That minimum is the amount
necessary to keep a worker as far above subsistence as is consistent
with human dignity in the culture and society in question. U.S.
companies that pay very high comparative wages can skew wages
to the detriment of local firms by attracting all the best workers
or by driving wages up beyond what local firms are able to pay.
Under the Soviet system, employers frequently supplied workers
with their social entitlements - vacations, education, medical care,
and retirement. 24 Should U.S. firms supply these while Russian
firms frequently no longer do so? Does failure to do so imply
exploitation? The answer to both questions appears to be no; but
how this norm is to be implemented and the conditions of work
and remuneration to which the U.S. firms commit themselves
should be worked out by them, once again conscious of the fact
that this will be made public. Unless the level to which U.S. firms
" For a discussion of exploitation of workers, see DE GEORGE, supra note
20, at 370-75, 479-81.
24 For a brief discussion of social entitlements under the Soviet system and
of the problems the system has caused under privatization, see JOSEPH R. BLASI
ET AL., KREMLIN CAPITALISM: PRIVATIZING THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY 14243
(1997).
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
commit themselves is obviously ethically justifiable, the exercise
will be a futile one.
The principles can be as broad or as specific as the signatories
agree upon before they are promulgated. Nevertheless, even at
their simplest and broadest, as listed in the items above, stating
and abiding by the norms at least sends the message that there are
norms in business that U.S. companies are willing to be held to
and agree to abide by. Other norms might be added, such as not
practicing gender or racial discrimination. The intent is not to
change ethically acceptable local practices but to commit oneself
to ethical norms that cross borders.
To be effective, the agreed-upon code must be broadly
publicized in Russia, and the participating firms must be publicly
identified. Adhering firms might adopt an identifying symbol that
can be placed on official stationery, business cards, and advertise-
ments. Signatories should submit to an audit of their practices,
and the results should be disclosed to the public.
Adoption of such a code will help set standards of doing
business for Russian firms; it will lend moral support to the large
numbers of ethical Russian entrepreneurs and workers; it will help
promote the laws, customs, and expectations that support free
economic activity in a free, but not exploitative, market economy.
Signatories can also reassure their stockholders at home that they
are willing to have their business conduct in Russia audited.
2.2.2. Arguments for Adoption of a "Sullivan-Type"
Code
A joint effort removes the onus from any particular company.
A joint effort, moreover, takes advantage of the strength available
in presenting a united front. Joint refusal of payment of bribes or
extortion lessens the necessary courage, cost, and difficulty of
refusal to do so individually. Such a joint stand offsets the power
of the mafia or of government officials with comparable strength
on the other side.
The corporations' public adoption of a code would bring out
in the open the problems of doing business in Russia. Corruption
thrives best in the shadows. When exposed to the glare of
publicity, however, corruption tends to recede. Publicity has a
number of other positive effects. Russians will be informed that
U.S. companies do not consider corruption part of the way of
doing business. Companies that wish to engage in business with
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honest Russian entrepreneurs will become known. Publicity will
lend support to attempts by government reformers who wish to
legislate and enforce legislation against corruption. Finally, U.S.
consumers will be assured that U.S. companies are operating
ethically despite the many reports of corruption in Russia that
appear in the U.S. media.
As in the case of the Sullivan Principles, an independent
accounting firm can be given the task of investigating and
certifying compliance with the code. Accounting that reflects
what a company has not done, for example, pay bribes, is more
difficult than accounting that reflects what a company has done,
for example, hiring or promoting blacks. But in order for the
code to work, some form of public accountability is necessary.
Each company's voluntary compliance can be expected to generate
pressure on all other signatories to also comply as agreed.
Violators should not and usually would not be tolerated by those
who comply.
Adoption of such a code might shine a spotlight on the lack
of efficient background institutions - laws, enforcement of
contract, rational tax structures - in the Russian system and both
encourage and promote the development of such institutions.
2.2.3. Arguments Against Adoption of a "Sullivan-Type"
Code
First, companies may behave ethically without being signato-
ries to a code. Subscription to the code involves incurring costs
that are arguably unnecessary. Moreover, if there is a code,
companies that act ethically and do not subscribe may unfairly be
considered to be acting unethically. Although both of these
arguments are true, the cost of allowing an audit is worthwhile
and far less than the cost of paying bribes and extortion.
Companies that are ethical, but choose not to sign, will not be
considered unethical automatically. However, such refusal may
raise questions. Additionally, non-subscribing companies will
have one less reason for rejecting demands for bribery and
extortion. The code and its auditing component, moreover,
would not be permanent. The auditing function would be
dropped when the society is stabilized and the crime and corrup-
tion are controlled.
Second, in the case of South Africa, U.S. opposition to
apartheid was vocal and provided an impetus for companies to
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subscribe to the Sullivan Principles. There is no groundswell of
opposition to corruption in Russia, in part, because the same kind
of corruption is found in so many other countries across the
globe. Moreover, in South Africa, the popular U.S. pressure was
to disinvest and leave South Africa. In Russia, there is no pressure
to invest there in the first place. In the absence of pressure from
U.S. consumers or stockholders to adopt such a code, why should
companies take the initiative and thereby expose themselves to
various kinds of damage and costs? The answer is that companies
need not be only reactive in their pursuit of ethical action,
especially when such pursuit, as in this case, is also good business.
No one forces any company to operate in Russia. However, if a
company decides to do so, it will protect itself, to some extent,
both at home and in Russia by becoming a signatory to such a set
of principles.
A third objection is that the FCPA already goes far enough;
some would say it already goes too far, and makes U.S. companies
less competitive than multinationals from other countries.
Arguably, by signing such a code, U.S. companies would volun-
tarily shackle themselves to a further competitive disadvantage.
The time is ripe to gain a foothold in Russia, however one does
it. Why leave that opportunity to less scrupulous companies from
other countries?
The answer is that by joining forces with other companies, all
are better off than any one company attempting to live up to its
norms on its own. The code sets the standard to which other
companies, and not only U.S. companies, can be held. Those
companies that get a foothold by paying bribes and extortion can
expect to continue making such payments indefinitely. Those
who demand such payments cannot be expected to stop doing so.
Once a company pays a bribe, it will become known as a
company that accedes to such payment pressures. It is highly
dubious that such payments give a company a competitive edge in
the long run.
Fourth, the people of South Africa clearly opposed apartheid
and supported implementation of the Sullivan Principles. In
contrast, the Russian people have not clearly voiced such a call for
action. This argument may be countered by the fact that the
Russian people do not favor corruption. They do not have the
experience to know about corporate codes or exemplary compa-
nies. They expect capitalists, and foreign capitalists would be no
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exception, to exploit them. This is all the more reason for
adopting a public set of principles.
A fifth objection is that Russia is not yet an attractive place
for U.S. companies to do business. While this is true, enough
U.S. companies are starting to make initial forays into Russia. It
is preferable for those companies considering entry into the
Russian market to have a public code or set of norms to guide
them, rather than to become caught up in the rampant Russian
corruption and only later react to it.
Sixth, the Sullivan Principles were proposed by Leon Sullivan
who was a member of the board of directors of General Motors,
the company that sponsored the Principles. 2s To be successful,
a large U.S. corporation would similarly have to take the initiative
in Russia. So far, no company has taken the initiative. Although
this is true, the objection only urges that some company or group
of companies should take the lead. The incentive to sponsor a
code is not only that it would be a good thing to do, but also that
sponsorship would make competing in the Russian market easier
for the company that takes the initiative. Instead of bearing the
brunt of resisting corruption by itself, a leading company would
garner the benefit of concerted effort. In addition, although the
idea for adopting such a code can come from anyone, those
companies that will be the signatories should draft the contents of
the code. The idea is not to impose norms on U.S. companies,
but for the signing companies to publicly commit themselves to
norms that they intend to follow.
A final objection to the proposal may be that Russia is no
different from a great many other countries, and the norms that
should be followed there are no different from those that
companies should follow anywhere else. Why should there be a
special code for Russia? Why not simply follow the Caux 26 or
Minnesota Principles,27 or some other set of principles applicable
internationally?
The answer is that conditions in Russia are in some ways
special, although a similar code would probably be appropriate for
I See WLLIAMs, supra note 21, at 6.
26 The Caux Round Table Principles for Business, BUS. ETHICS: THE MAG.
OF SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE Bus., May/June 1995, at 26-27.
27 MINNESOTA CTR. FOR CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, THE MINNESOTA
PRINCIPLES (1992).
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doing business in China, especially if and when the present regime
is replaced by a more democratic one and the command economy
gives way to free enterprise. The code specifies nothing special
for U.S. companies. The widespread corruption and crime in
Russia, however, necessitate such a code. The Russian situation
is special because there is a great deal at stake in Russia's future.
Historically, a turn towards a repressive government is frequently
the counter to widespread corruption and popular discontent.
Moreover, Russia is a nuclear power. The dangers of the corrup-
tion and crime reaching to nuclear weapons and of a repressive
regime holding those weapons make the stakes very high. Neither
the degree of corruption nor the potential threat to other
countries is present in the other former communist states, or in
the many other countries in which corruption is present in
significant forms.
3. CONCLUSION
The Sullivan Principles, which prohibited discrimination, did
not call for any extraordinary ethical conduct on the part of U.S.
companies, and did not ask them to act with respect to discrimina-
tion any differently than they do in the United States and
elsewhere. The Sullivan Principles, however, were a response to
a specific need. A code for operating in Russia and the other
former Soviet states similarly would be a solution to a specific
problem. The absence of civil society and of the norms and
values that are part of it make Russia and the former Soviet states
different from such former socialist countries as Poland and the
Czech Republic in which civil society was not destroyed.
The situation in Russia demands an imaginative response by
U.S. firms. Hence, there is a need for something visible in Russia,
for a defense of ethics in capitalism, and for large U.S. companies
to take the lead in concert. U.S. firms at least share the benefits
and the burdens of being required to abide by the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, and so have a special incentive to take the
lead in attempting to establish similar conditions of competition
for all. Once U.S. firms have taken the lead, they may well hope
that European and other firms will follow their lead and be
willing and anxious to join the coalition as well. There is a great
deal more at stake than just ethics in business. A "Sullivan-type"
code for U.S. companies operating in Russia is an idea whose time
has come.
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